Beyond Ransomware: Tracking the Underground Trade in Law Firm Access and Data
Key Takeaways
- 法律事務所的系統存取權限可能遭長期反覆兜售,資安事件結案不代表曝險已經結束。 趨勢科技 TrendAI™ 研究團隊發現,美國賓州一家綜合法律事務所的資料庫存取權限,在 16 個月內至少被刊登販售 19 次,並由不同賣家重新包裝及兜售。這顯示遭外流的存取權限可能在地下市場持續流通,即使資安事件已完成處置,相關風險仍未必消失。
- 中小型法律事務所成為地下市場的交易目標,部分系統存取權限標價低於 1,000 美元。 研究發現,法律事務所的網路存取權限曾以 200 美元至 1,500 美元的價格刊登,其中多數存取權限或資料的刊登價格低於 1,000 美元。最常見的存取類型是 VPN 憑證,其次為遠端桌面協定(RDP)存取權限,涉及人身傷害、移民及勞工補償等法律業務。這些價格是賣家的開價,不代表交易已完成。
- 公開的勒索軟體資料洩露網站無法呈現全部威脅,地下市場交易已涉及多國法律事務所。 2025 年 1 月至 2026 年 9 月期間,研究團隊發現 87 筆涉及法律事務所存取權限或資料的地下市場刊登紀錄,涵蓋 69 個不同組織,約 21% 為重複刊登。多數相關組織未出現在公開的勒索軟體資料洩露網站。此外,經核對的地下市場刊登紀錄涉及 11 個國家,顯示相關風險不限於美國。
- 勒索攻擊不一定需要加密檔案,竊取機密資料也能成為勒索手段。 Silent Ransom Group(又稱 Luna Moth)在研究觀察期間涉及全球 51 個具名受害目標。該組織不以加密檔案為主要手法,而是竊取機密資料,並直接聯繫受害者施壓。這顯示企業除了防範傳統勒索軟體,也必須監控異常資料存取及外傳活動。
- 法律事務所應強化遠端存取驗證與資料外洩監控,事件處置完成後仍須持續追蹤。 研究建議針對 VPN、RDP、Citrix 等遠端存取服務導入抗網路釣魚的多因素驗證(MFA),並監控文件管理系統及客戶資料的異常存取。資安事件處置完成後,仍應更新相關存取憑證、持續監控地下市場的販售活動,並透過既有可信管道核實 IT 支援要求。
Between January 2025 and September 2026, we tracked 544 victims in the legal sector worldwide on ransomware leak sites, including 372 US-based firms. We also identified 87 underground listings advertising access to or data from law firms and legal services providers. Those listings involved 69 distinct organizations, meaning roughly 21% were repeat postings. Most of these organizations never appeared on a public leak site.
The 372 US victims were attributed to 64 distinct ransomware and extortion groups. Akira accounted for 55 victims, followed by INC Ransom (53), Silent Ransom Group (45), and Qilin (35). The remaining victims were spread across smaller and newer groups.
However, leak sites capture only the attacks that become public. They do not account for access that was sold but never used, firms that paid quietly, or credentials that remain available to buyers.
How underground markets price and sell law firm access
Our findings come from monitoring cybercrime forums, including BreachForums, exploit.in, xss.is, and DarkForums, as well as seller channels on Telegram. These were original underground listings rather than reposts from leak sites.
While we directly observed the listings, advertised prices are not confirmed sales, and the sellers’ claims do not establish that a breach occurred. The listings also show how access to law firms and their data is marketed to potential buyers.
One seller advertised 1.6 TB of data tied to a US immigration law firm and offered 24,000 passport files separately for roughly US$1,000. Another listed 38 GB of data purportedly from a Canadian law firm for US$3,500. A third sought US$10,000 for documents attributed to a Brazilian law firm specializing in banking law. Some sellers also shared data for free.
Three firms named in our listings have publicly disclosed breaches. Their disclosures substantiate our findings that the underground trade in law firm data is not merely a criminal claim.
Most listings for access to or data from specific firms were priced below US$1,000. Virtual private network (VPN) credentials were the most common access type, followed by Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access.
The firms named were predominantly small and midsize practices specializing in personal injury, immigration, workers’ compensation, and general practice. These firms hold sensitive client information and often operate with lean security programs.
The sellers also behave like brokers. Access to law firms appeared alongside access to manufacturers, hospitals, and logistics firms, advertised by technologies such as Fortinet, SonicWall, and Remote Desktop Web Access (RDWeb). Our verified listings named firms across 11 countries. We also found a LexisNexis Public Records lookup account advertised for resale.
| The firm’s location | First seen | Channel | What was offered | Asking price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| West Virginia | January 2024 | Forum shop | Company logs with cookies and RDP access | US$2,100 |
| Chicago | September 2024 | Lockbit/Meow/Reseller channel | Bulk data set | US$500/US$1,500 |
| Texas | November 2024 | Lockbit/Meow/Reseller channel | Database access, 360 GB | US$6,000 |
| US (unnamed) | February 2025 | BreachForums | VPN access | US$300 – US$400 |
| Los Angeles | April 2025 | BreachForums | 106 GB legal and medical data | US$15,000 |
| US (unnamed) | June 2025 | Aggregated listing | RDWeb access, domain user, US$8M-revenue firm | US$5,500 |
| Ontario, Canada | June 2025 | exploit.in | 38 GB data set | US$3,500 |
| Atlanta | May 2026 | xss.is | Approximately 2,400 client case files | From US$50 |
| Nebraska | Not stated | xss.is | Data and access | US$700 – US$2,000 |
| Top private firm in Israel (unnamed) | Not stated | exploit.in | VPN administrator access, 2 TB | US$100 |
| LexisNexis lookup account | Not stated | Telegram | LexisNexis Public Records lookup account offered for resale (US and international) | US$850 / US$150 |
Law firm access can be resold repeatedly for more than a year
Our research also found that access to the same firm can circulate through multiple sellers and channels over extended periods.
For example, database access to a general practice law firm in Pennsylvania was advertised at least 19 times over 16 months, from May 2024 to September 2025. The listing originated on a ransomware operator’s blog before appearing on other channels and being advertised by independent resellers.
Similarly, an offer of more than 1 TB of confidential data from a workers’ compensation defense firm appeared 18 times across at least nine channels.
This pattern highlights two findings. First, counting listings without identifying distinct firms overstates the number of distinct compromises. Second, and more importantly for defenders, a firm’s exposure does not necessarily end when an incident is contained. Access can continue circulating and attract new buyers long after the firm considers the matter closed.
Silent Ransom Group uses data theft without ransomware encryption
The underground threat extends beyond conventional ransomware attacks. Silent Ransom Group, also tracked as Luna Moth, accounted for 51 named victims worldwide during our monitoring period.
Unlike conventional ransomware groups, Silent Ransom Group does not encrypt files and, in our findings, does not operate a conventional onion leak site. Instead, it threatens to expose confidential client information and contacts their victims directly.
We also identified impersonation domains using a helpdesk- naming pattern to spoof specific US law firms. Registered during a short period in July 2026, these domains were consistent with fake IT support tactics associated with this form of extortion. They were dormant at the time of writing, and we classified them as targeting infrastructure rather than evidence of confirmed compromise.
Without encryption or service outages to signal an attack, defenders need to detect data theft itself, including bulk access to document systems and client repositories.
Security priorities for law firms
The findings highlight the need for security measures that address both unauthorized access and data theft:
- Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) across VPN, RDP, Citrix, and other remote access portals.
- Treat contained incidents as ongoing exposure. Rotate credentials, reissue certificates, and continue monitoring underground channels for the firm’s domain and data after remediation.
- Verify IT support requests through trusted channels. Use callback numbers already on file rather than those supplied by a caller.
- Monitor for bulk access and data loss across document management systems, email archives, and client repositories.
- Prioritize security investment by potential impact, not listing volume. Inexpensive access does not mean low risk.
Public leak sites reveal when attacks become public, but they miss the underground trade that can precede an attack and continue long afterward. For law firms, containing an incident does not necessarily end their exposure.
For our full findings and analysis, download our research brief .