Skip to main content

Due gravi vulnerabilità di PHP sono trapelate prima della pubblicazione della patch: cosa dovrebbero fare ora le organizzazioni

Return to Ricerca approfondita TrendAI™
Cyber crime

Beyond Ransomware: Tracking the Underground Trade in Law Firm Access and Data

TrendAI™ Research found that cybercriminals sell and resell access to law firms and their data on underground markets, often before an attack becomes public and long after an incident is considered closed.

Cyber crime Cybercriminal underground Professional services
TrendAI
Beyond Ransomware: Tracking the Underground Trade in Law Firm Access and Data

Key Takeaways

  • Access to a law firm can be resold repeatedly over long period. Database access to a general practice firm in Pennsylvania was advertised at least 19 times over 16 months, rebranded and readvertised by different sellers.
  • The underground market favors inexpensive access to small and midsize firms. Network access was repeatedly advertised for US$200 and US$1,500, with personal injury, immigration, and workers’ compensation practices dominating the listings.
  • The market extends beyond US law firms. Initial access brokers advertise law firms alongside hospitals, manufacturers, and logistics firms, often categorizing access by the target’s revenue band and technology used. Our verified listings covered 11 countries and included a legal research account offered for resale.
  • Data theft extortion can occur without ransomware encryption. Silent Ransom Group, also tracked as Luna Moth, accounted for 51 named victims worldwide. The group steals confidential data without encrypting files, highlighting the need for security controls that can detect malicious activity beyond traditional ransomware indicators.

Between January 2025 and September 2026, we tracked 544 victims in the legal sector worldwide on ransomware leak sites, including 372 US-based firms. We also identified 87 underground listings advertising access to or data from law firms and legal services providers. Those listings involved 69 distinct organizations, meaning roughly 21% were repeat postings. Most of these organizations never appeared on a public leak site.

Figure 1. Ransomware and extortion victims in the US legal sector by threat group, from January 2025 to September 2026
Figure 1. Ransomware and extortion victims in the US legal sector by threat group, from January 2025 to September 2026

The 372 US victims were attributed to 64 distinct ransomware and extortion groups. Akira accounted for 55 victims, followed by INC Ransom (53), Silent Ransom Group (45), and Qilin (35). The remaining victims were spread across smaller and newer groups.

However, leak sites capture only the attacks that become public. They do not account for access that was sold but never used, firms that paid quietly, or credentials that remain available to buyers.

How underground markets price and sell law firm access

Our findings come from monitoring cybercrime forums, including BreachForums, exploit.in, xss.is, and DarkForums, as well as seller channels on Telegram. These were original underground listings rather than reposts from leak sites.

While we directly observed the listings, advertised prices are not confirmed sales, and the sellers’ claims do not establish that a breach occurred. The listings also show how access to law firms and their data is marketed to potential buyers.

One seller advertised 1.6 TB of data tied to a US immigration law firm and offered 24,000 passport files separately for roughly US$1,000. Another listed 38 GB of data purportedly from a Canadian law firm for US$3,500. A third sought US$10,000 for documents attributed to a Brazilian law firm specializing in banking law. Some sellers also shared data for free.

Three firms named in our listings have publicly disclosed breaches. Their disclosures substantiate our findings that the underground trade in law firm data is not merely a criminal claim.

Most listings for access to or data from specific firms were priced below US$1,000. Virtual private network (VPN) credentials were the most common access type, followed by Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access.

The firms named were predominantly small and midsize practices specializing in personal injury, immigration, workers’ compensation, and general practice. These firms hold sensitive client information and often operate with lean security programs.

The sellers also behave like brokers. Access to law firms appeared alongside access to manufacturers, hospitals, and logistics firms, advertised by technologies such as Fortinet, SonicWall, and Remote Desktop Web Access (RDWeb). Our verified listings named firms across 11 countries. We also found a LexisNexis Public Records lookup account advertised for resale.

The firm’s location First seen Channel What was offered Asking price
West Virginia January 2024 Forum shop Company logs with cookies and RDP access US$2,100
Chicago September 2024 Lockbit/Meow/Reseller channel Bulk data set US$500/US$1,500
Texas November 2024 Lockbit/Meow/Reseller channel Database access, 360 GB US$6,000
US (unnamed) February 2025 BreachForums VPN access US$300 – US$400
Los Angeles April 2025 BreachForums 106 GB legal and medical data US$15,000
US (unnamed) June 2025 Aggregated listing RDWeb access, domain user, US$8M-revenue firm US$5,500
Ontario, Canada June 2025 exploit.in 38 GB data set US$3,500
Atlanta May 2026 xss.is Approximately 2,400 client case files From US$50
Nebraska Not stated xss.is Data and access US$700 – US$2,000
Top private firm in Israel (unnamed) Not stated exploit.in VPN administrator access, 2 TB US$100
LexisNexis lookup account Not stated Telegram LexisNexis Public Records lookup account offered for resale (US and international) US$850 / US$150
Table 1. Sample verified listings offering access to or data from a specific US or allied law firm, drawn from our underground findings. Note: Prices are asking prices from criminal-controlled channels, not confirmed sales. The seller handles and contact strings are withheld.

Law firm access can be resold repeatedly for more than a year

Our research also found that access to the same firm can circulate through multiple sellers and channels over extended periods.

For example, database access to a general practice law firm in Pennsylvania was advertised at least 19 times over 16 months, from May 2024 to September 2025. The listing originated on a ransomware operator’s blog before appearing on other channels and being advertised by independent resellers.

Similarly, an offer of more than 1 TB of confidential data from a workers’ compensation defense firm appeared 18 times across at least nine channels.

This pattern highlights two findings. First, counting listings without identifying distinct firms overstates the number of distinct compromises. Second, and more importantly for defenders, a firm’s exposure does not necessarily end when an incident is contained. Access can continue circulating and attract new buyers long after the firm considers the matter closed.

Silent Ransom Group uses data theft without ransomware encryption

The underground threat extends beyond conventional ransomware attacks. Silent Ransom Group, also tracked as Luna Moth, accounted for 51 named victims worldwide during our monitoring period.

Unlike conventional ransomware groups, Silent Ransom Group does not encrypt files and, in our findings, does not operate a conventional onion leak site. Instead, it threatens to expose confidential client information and contacts their victims directly.

We also identified impersonation domains using a helpdesk- naming pattern to spoof specific US law firms. Registered during a short period in July 2026, these domains were consistent with fake IT support tactics associated with this form of extortion. They were dormant at the time of writing, and we classified them as targeting infrastructure rather than evidence of confirmed compromise.

Without encryption or service outages to signal an attack, defenders need to detect data theft itself, including bulk access to document systems and client repositories.

Security priorities for law firms

The findings highlight the need for security measures that address both unauthorized access and data theft:

  • Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) across VPN, RDP, Citrix, and other remote access portals.
  • Treat contained incidents as ongoing exposure. Rotate credentials, reissue certificates, and continue monitoring underground channels for the firm’s domain and data after remediation.
  • Verify IT support requests through trusted channels. Use callback numbers already on file rather than those supplied by a caller.
  • Monitor for bulk access and data loss across document management systems, email archives, and client repositories.
  • Prioritize security investment by potential impact, not listing volume. Inexpensive access does not mean low risk.

Public leak sites reveal when attacks become public, but they miss the underground trade that can precede an attack and continue long afterward. For law firms, containing an incident does not necessarily end their exposure.

For our full findings and analysis, download our research brief .