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Ransomware

Anubis: A Closer Look at an Emerging Ransomware with Built-in Wiper

Anubis is an emerging ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group that adds a destructive edge to the typical double-extortion model with its file-wiping feature. We explore its origins and examine the tactics behind its dual-threat approach.

Ransomware & extortionRansomware as a Service (RaaS)

Key Takeaways

  • Anubis is an emerging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that combines file encryption with file destruction — a rare dual-threat capability.
  • The ransomware has an optional "wipe mode" feature which permanently erases the contents of the files. This suggests that the threat actor could wipe their victim's files if the ransom is not paid.
  • Anubis runs a flexible affiliate program, offering negotiable revenue splits and supporting additional monetization paths like data extortion and access sales.
  • Active since December 2024, Anubis has claimed victims in multiple sectors including healthcare and construction, across regions such as Australia, Canada, Peru, and the U.S.
  • Trend Vision One™ detects and blocks the IOCs discussed in this blog. Trend Vision One customers can also access hunting queries, threat insights, and threat intelligence reports to gain rich context and the latest updates on Anubis.

A new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group has emerged and has been making a name for itself in 2025. Anubis is a recently identified group that sets itself apart by partnering encryption with more destructive capabilities—wiping directories which severely impact chances of file recovery. Given its brief history and use of a multi-layered extortion model, Anubis has all the markings of an evolving and flexible RaaS operation.

Trend™ Research has observed specific command line operations for these destructive actions, including attempts to change system settings and wipe directories. This entry takes a closer look into these capabilities. 

Origins

Anubis joined the X (formerly Twitter) in December 2024. Around the same time, our team identified a sample called Sphinx, which appeared to be in development, evidenced by its ransom note that lacked both a TOR site and a unique ID, as shown in Figure 1.

Sphinx ransom note
Figure 1. Sphinx’s ransom note

When we compared the binaries of Anubis and Sphinx, they were highly identical, with only a minor difference—the function that generated the ransom note. These observations suggest that while the core of the malware remained the same, the messaging and branding were updated for the malware’s eventual debut as Anubis.

Affiliate program monetization

By 2025, Anubis officially became active on cybercrime forums. Representatives of Anubis have been observed on both RAMP and XSS, using the monikers “supersonic” and “Anubis__media” respectively. Both accounts posted in Russian.

On February 23, 2025, “superSonic” advertised a “new format” of affiliate programs on the RAMP forum. All their proposed revenue-share structures are open to negotiation for long-term cooperation. Other research has already covered the group’s RAMP posting, which outlines Anubis’s capabilities along with the structure of their affiliate programs. This is notable because the group appears to go beyond typical RaaS and double extortion for monetization, offering additional affiliate programs such as a data ransomware affiliate program and an access monetization affiliate program.

Victimology

In terms of activity, seven victims have been listed on the group’s leak site as of writing. The group has targeted a range of industries, including healthcare, engineering, and construction, across multiple regions, such as Australia, Canada, Peru, and the United States. The wide range of targets suggests an opportunistic approach across different regions and industries.

Anubis’s file-wiping function

What further sets Anubis apart from other RaaS and lends an edge to its operations is its use of a file wiping feature, designed to sabotage recovery efforts even after encryption. This destructive tendency adds pressure on victims and raises the stakes of an already damaging attack. Figure 2 outlines the techniques Anubis uses to deliver, execute, and enforce this dual-threat behavior.

Figure 2. Anubis’s attack chain
Figure 2. Anubis’s attack chain

Initial Access

T1566 - Phishing

The initial entry vector is established through spear phishing emails that include malicious attachments or links. These emails are carefully constructed to appear as if they come from trusted sources, luring recipients into opening the attachments or clicking the links.

Execution

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

The ransomware takes multiple parameters as input and depends on them to function properly.

Parameters Description
"/KEY=" Key
"/elevated" elevate privilege
"/WIPEMODE" wipe mode
"/PFAD=" directories to exclude
"/PATH=" specific paths should be encrypted
Table 1. Anubis parameters

Defense Evasion

T1078 - Valid Accounts

The process first checks for admin privileges, and if detected, displays the message "Admin privileges detected. Attempting to elevate to SYSTEM..."

Anubis detecting admin privileges and displaying a system elevation message when detected.
Figure 3. Anubis detecting admin privileges and displaying a system elevation message when detected.

Otherwise, it prompts the user with "No admin privileges. Start process anyway?" and waits for input, while also having the capability to re-launch itself with the /elevated parameter upon gaining higher privileges. These interactive prompts show that the malware is still being improved and developed.

Anubis’s prompt and fallback behavior
Figure 4. Anubis’s prompt and fallback behavior when admin privileges are not detected.

Privilege Escalation

T1134.002 - Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token 

The program performs a check to determine if the current user has administrative privileges by attempting to access the system's primary physical drive, typically referred to as "\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0". This is a low-level operation that generally requires elevated permission.

The code checks if the current user has special permissions (administrative rights) by trying to access the main hard drive of the computer.

Anubis code that checks for administrative privileges before executing elevated actions
Figure 5. Anubis code that checks for administrative privileges before executing elevated actions.

Discovery

T1083 - File and Directory Discovery

Here is the list of folders avoided during encryption:

windows, system32, programdata, program files, program files (x86), AppData, public, system volume information, \\system volume information, efi, boot, public, perflogs, microsoft, intel, .dotnet, .gradle, .nuget, .vscode, msys64

Impact

T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery

The ransomware runs the command vssadmin delete shadows /for=norealvolume /all /quiet to delete all Volume Shadow Copies on the specified drive, thereby inhibiting the ability to restore files from previous versions.

T1489 - Service Stop

For a full list of terminated processes and disabled or stopped services, refer to the list of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact

The encryption uses Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and is publicly available in GitHub written in Go.

A list of functions from a Go (Golang) package related to Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).
Figure 6. A list of functions from a Go (Golang) package related to Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).

Upon checking, the ECIES library for its encryption algorithm is similar to EvilByte/Prince ransomware.

ECIES encryption code in Anubis, similar to the implementations seen in EvilByte and Prince ransomware.
Figure 7. ECIES encryption code in Anubis, similar to the implementations seen in EvilByte and Prince ransomware.

Drops Icons and Wallpaper Image

The code extracts two files, "icon.ico" and "wall.jpg", from the program and saves them to the computer's "C:\Programdata" folder.

Code snippet showing Anubis extracting and saving “icon.ico” and “wall.jpg” to the C:\ProgramData folder.
Figure 8. Code snippet showing Anubis extracting and saving “icon.ico” and “wall.jpg” to the C:\ProgramData folder.

It modifies the icons of encrypted files to instead use its logo, which is shown in Figure 9.

Anubis’s logo
Figure 9. Anubis’s logo

It also attempts to change the wallpaper using a file named "wall.jpg," but this action failed in our testing since no such file was dropped.

Image from Trend Vision One reveals that the Anubis ransomware tried to use the command line to change the desktop wallpaper to "C:\ProgramData\wall.jpg", but the attempt was unsuccessful.
Figure 10. Image from Trend Vision One reveals that the Anubis ransomware tried to use the command line to change the desktop wallpaper to "C:\ProgramData\wall.jpg", but the attempt was unsuccessful.
Files encrypted with the extension ".anubis."  and alteration of the system icon.
Figure 11. Files encrypted with the extension ".anubis." and alteration of the system icon.

The Anubis ransom note employs a double extortion strategy, threatening to publicly release stolen data if their demands are not fulfilled.

The ransom note file named RESTORE FILES.html, by the “ANUBIS team” after encrypting the victim's files.
Figure 12. The ransom note file named RESTORE FILES.html, by the “ANUBIS team” after encrypting the victim's files.

T1485 - Data Destruction

Wiper

Additionally, the ransomware includes a wiper feature using /WIPEMODE parameter, which can permanently delete the contents of a file, preventing any recovery attempt.

Command line interface with the "/WIPEMODE" parameter. The command includes a key for authentication.
Figure 13. Command line interface with the "/WIPEMODE" parameter. The command includes a key for authentication.

Figures 14 and 15 show the before and after using the wipe mode which erases the contents of the file.

The directory before "wipemode" has been applied.
Figure 14. The directory before "wipemode" has been applied.
The same directory after "wipemode" has been applied. The files remain listed, but their sizes are now 0 KB, indicating that their contents have been completely erased.
Figure 15. The same directory after "wipemode" has been applied. The files remain listed, but their sizes are now 0 KB, indicating that their contents have been completely erased.
Tactic Technique ID
Initial Access Phishing T1566
Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059
Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token T1134.002
Defense Evasion Valid Accounts T1078
Discovery File and Directory Discovery T1083
Discovery Process Discovery T1057
Impact Service Stop T1489
Impact Data Encrypted for Impact T1486
Impact Data Destruction T1485
Table 2. Summary of TTPs used by Anubis

Conclusion and recommendations

The emergence of the Anubis marks a significant evolution in the landscape of cyberthreats, particularly with its dual-threat ransomware capabilities and flexible affiliate programs. By combining RaaS with added monetization strategies, such as data ransomware and access monetization affiliate programs, Anubis is maximizing its revenue potential and expanding its reach within the cybercriminal ecosystem. Its ability to both encrypt and permanently destroying data significantly raises the stakes for victims, amplifying the pressure to comply—just as strong ransomware operations aim to do.

Given the tactics discussed—such as spear-phishing, command-line execution, privilege escalation, shadow copy deletion, and file wiping—security measures that address these are critical in defending against Anubis. Additionally, maintaining offline and offsite backups can help mitigate the impact of Anubis’s wiping capabilities.

To proactively defend against attacks utilizing Anubis ransomware, enterprises should implement a comprehensive security strategy that includes the following best practices:

  • Email and web safety: Exercise caution with email and web practices. Avoid downloading attachments, clicking on links, or installing applications unless the source is verified and trusted. Implement web filtering to restrict access to known malicious websites. This should help avoid the initial entry of similar threats.
  • Data backup: Regularly back up critical data and implement a robust recovery plan. This includes maintaining offline and immutable backups to ensure file recovery even if files are encrypted or wiped.
  • Access control:Limit administrative rights and access privileges to employees only when necessary. Regularly review and adjust permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access.
  • Regular updates and scanning: Ensure that all security software is updated regularly and conduct periodic scans to identify vulnerabilities. Use endpoint security solutions to detect and block malicious components and suspicious behavior.
  • User education: Conduct regular training sessions for employees on recognizing social engineering tactics and the dangers of phishing. This awareness can significantly reduce the likelihood of falling victim to such attacks
  • Multilayered security approach: Adopt a multilayered defense strategy that includes endpoint, email, web, and network security. This approach will help protect against potential entry points into the system and enhance overall threat detection capabilities.
  • Sandboxing and application control: Use sandboxing tools to analyze files before they are executed, ensuring that any suspicious files are scanned for potential threats. Enforce application control policies to prevent the execution of unauthorized applications and scripts.
  • Monitoring for abnormal activity: Implement security information and event management (SIEM) tools to monitor for unusual script executions and outbound connections. This proactive monitoring can help identify and mitigate threats before they escalate.

Proactive security with Trend Vision One™

Trend Vision One™ is the only AI-powered enterprise cybersecurity platform that centralizes cyber risk exposure management, security operations, and robust layered protection. This comprehensive approach helps you predict and prevent threats, accelerating proactive security outcomes across your entire digital estate. Backed by decades of cybersecurity leadership and Trend Cybertron, the industry's first proactive cybersecurity AI, it delivers proven results: a 92% reduction in ransomware risk and a 99% reduction in detection time. Security leaders can benchmark their posture and showcase continuous improvement to stakeholders. With Trend Vision One, you’re enabled to eliminate security blind spots, focus on what matters most, and elevate security into a strategic partner for innovation.

Trend Micro™ Threat Intelligence

To stay ahead of evolving threats, Trend customers can access Trend Vision One™ Threat Insights, which provides the latest insights from Trend Research on emerging threats and threat actors.  

Trend Vision One Threat Insights

Emerging Threats: Anubis Ransomware: The Dual Threat of Encryption and Destruction

Trend Vision One Intelligence Reports (IOC Sweeping)

Anubis Ransomware: The Dual Threat of Encryption and Destruction

Hunting Queries

Trend Vision One Search App

Trend Vision One customers can use the Search App to match or hunt the malicious indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their environment.    

Detection of Potentially Malicious Command Execution

processCmd: /\/KEY=[A-Za-z0-9]{30,} \/(?:WIPEMODE|elevated)/

More hunting queries are available for Trend Vision One customers with Threat Insights Entitlement enabled.

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

The indicators of compromise for this entry can be found here.